Tuesday, October 26, 2010
Commodity Futures Trading Commission: Silver Market is Manipulated
Dow Jones newswires reports:
Bart Chilton, a commissioner at the Commodity Futures Trading Commission ... said he thinks “the public deserves some answers to their concerns that silver markets are being, and have been, manipulated.”
“I believe there have been repeated attempts to influence prices in the silver markets,” he said. “There have been fraudulent efforts to persuade and deviously control that price.”
He urged prosecution of those who may have violated the law, but said he can’t prejudge what the agency will do with its investigation.
Reuters confirms:
Commissioner Bart Chilton said ... the silver market needs attention. "I believe that there have been repeated attempts to influence prices in the silver markets. There have been fraudulent efforts to persuade and deviously control that price," Chilton said. He declined to provide further details. The CFTC began a probe into allegations of manipulation in silver in September 2008, but has not provided information about when it hopes to conclude. See this for background. It is unclear whether the CFTC will take any real action to stop the manipulation, whether the CFTC will sweep the issue under the rug, or whether Chilton's statements are an attempt to restore the reputation of the CFTC after 1 of its 2 administrative law judges accused the other of vowing never to rule for a complainant.
How Did the Banks Get Away With Pledging Mortgages to Multiple Buyers?
- With a mortgage sold to two different entities, wouldn't the income from the mortgage be shown on the books of both entities?
- Was the interest/principal payments that were made by the homeowner before they stopped being divided between both entities? If so, wouldn't this have rung alarm bells immediately?
- If only one was getting it, why didn't the other entity immediately try to foreclose?
- If there was one servicer involved, was the servicer covering the difference between what was collected and the payments actually made? If so, how did the servicer do this and still remain in business?
- If two servicers were involved, why didn't this come out sooner or were both servicers hiding this fraud?
So I wrote to some of the leading experts on mortgage fraud - L. Randall Wray (economics professor), Christopher Whalen (banking expert with Institutional Risk Analytics), and William K. Black (professor of economics and law, and the senior regulator during the S & L crisis) - to seek their insight.
Chris Whalen told me:All good points, but the short answer is that nobody may have noticed until now. The issue of substitution and other games played by servicers makes exact tracking of loans problematic. It should show up in the servicers reports and should be caught, but there are a lot of things that go on in loan servicing that nobody talks about. Until about 2006, the GSEs and banks would advance cash and would substitute, but not now. The noble practitioners you heard from are all sincere and want to believe in intelligent design.
Whalen explained:
Professor Black told me:Prior to FAS [i.e. Financial Accounting Standards] 166/167, a defaulted loan might sit in a FNM/FRE pool for up to a year before the default was removed from the trust. The issuer would then place a new loan into the pool or “substitute” for the old loan. No purchase event was booked. The investor would never know. In fact, the issuer would keep paying interest on the original principal amount in those days. Now under FAS 166/167, the issuer must immediately repurchase the defaulted loan and take the loss less estimated recovery. That is why the pace picked up this year when it comes to repurchase demands.
You should refer your dubious and very naive friends to the case of National Bank of Keystone, WV. One of the worst failures per $ of assets in FDIC history. The management hid a Ponzi scheme in the loan servicing area for five years. Paid interest to investors with their own principal. Two auditors missed the fraud and later were sued by the FDIC acting as receiver for the dead bank. And this was a small operation. The big five are an even worse mess. Remember, when the seller of a loan and the servicer are the same, anything can happen. And it usually does.
Double pledges (as they're typically called, though one could pledge multiple times) are a well known fraud device. It is correct that one of the key purposes of adopting Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) was to reduce the risk and frequency of this form of fraud. So, double pledges in the modern era require both (A) fraud (on the part of the borrower or purchaser) and incompetence, indifference, or corruption on the part of the original secured lender or their agents if the borrower is the fraudster or the purchasers if they are the fraudsters.And professor Wray told me that record-keeping by servicers was terrible, and pointed me to the following article from the Tampa Tribune:
The two potential sources of fraud: A fraudulent borrower could pledge the same home as security for multiple mortgage loans. Title checks, by the lender/title insurer are so easy to conduct and so vital to protect the lender that this form of fraud is vanishingly rare. Alternatively, and far more likely, the lender could sell the mortgage to multiple buyers. Those buyers could have far lower incentives to check on prior pledges and less ability to check for prior pledges. The entity selling a loan to multiple parties (A) has a compelling incentive to hide the prior pledge(s), (B) is financially sophisticated, and
therefore more capable of deception than a homeowner, and (C) can pick who to make the multiple sales to -- allowing them to select the most vulnerable targets for fraud.
Subpart (C) provides the logical transition to the second requisite for multiple pledge frauds -- vulnerable victims. The characteristics they would exhibit include (A) growing massively, (B) purchasing nonprime loans without fully underwriting the quality of the loans (and quality in this context inherently requires superb "paperwork"), (C) poor internal and external controls, and (D) opaque systems that make it extremely difficult to determine the beneficial owner and locate key mortgage documents that would reveal multiple sales. Unfortunately, these four characteristics were characteristic of many purchasers of nonprime mortgages. That is why I have long stated that the process was dominated by the financial sector equivalent of "don't ask; don't tell."
Bottom line: the elite bankers and the anti-regulators have been so unwilling to
find the truth that no one knows how bad these frauds became. Finding the facts
is essential and can and should be done by reviewing samples of the loans pledged or sold to Fannie and Freddie and the Fed.
Peter Bakowski, a 58-year-old former Tampa mortgage broker, has admitted orchestrating a Ponzi scheme that involved more than 30 investors and institutions and more than 150 deals, documents show.
***
Bakowski sold the mortgage assignments to multiple investors, promising high rates of return and using all the money he generated to "keep the scheme afloat," according to his plea agreement.
Monday, October 25, 2010
Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs: Iraq War "Based On a Series of Lies"
In his recently published memoir, "Without Hesitation: The Odyssey of an American Warrior," General Hugh Shelton, who served as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1997 to 2001, called the Iraq war "unnecessary" and said that the Bush team went to war "based on a series of lies."
Shelton also said that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of State Paul Wolfowitz and other Pentagon officials pushed for war in Iraq "almost to the point of insubordination."
This is not some voice from the peanut gallery.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is - by law - the highest ranking military officer in the United States armed forces, and the principal military adviser to the President of the United States. The Chairman outranks all respective heads of each service branch, including the heads of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines.
Thank you, General Shelton, for confirming what Seymour Hersh and many others have been saying since 2003 (and see this).
Is Unemployment as Bad as During the Great Depression?
It is difficult to compare current unemployment with that during the Great Depression. In the Depression, unemployment numbers weren't tracked very consistently, and the U-3 and U-6 statistics we use today weren't used back then. And statistical "adjustments" such as the "birth-death model" are being used today that weren't used in the 1930s.
But let's discuss the facts we do know.
The Wall Street Journal noted in July 2009:
The average length of unemployment is higher than it's been since government began tracking the data in 1948.
***
The job losses are also now equal to the net job gains over the previous nine years, making this the only recession since the Great Depression to wipe out all job growth from the previous expansion.
The Christian Science Monitor wrote an article in June entitled, "Length of unemployment reaches Great Depression levels".
60 Minutes - in a must-watch segment - notes that our current situation tops the Great Depression in one respect: never have we had a recession this deep with a recovery this flat. 60 Minutes points out that unemployment has been at 9.5% or above for 14 months:
Pulitzer Prize-winning historian David M. Kennedy notes in Freedom From Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945 (Oxford, 1999) that - during Herbert Hoover's presidency, more than 13 million Americans lost their jobs. Of those, 62% found themselves out of work for longer than a year; 44% longer than two years; 24% longer than three years; and 11% longer than four years.
Blytic calculates that the current average duration of unemployment is some 32 weeks, the median duration is around 20 weeks, and there are approximately 6 million people unemployed for 27 weeks or longer.
Moreover, employers are discriminating against job applicants who are currently unemployed, which will almost certainly prolong the duration of joblessness.
As I noted in January 2009:
In 1930, there were 123 million Americans.
At the height of the Depression in 1933, 24.9% of the total work force or 11,385,000 people, were unemployed.
Will unemployment reach 25% during this current crisis?
I don't know. But the number of people unemployed will be higher than during the Depression.
Specifically, there are currently some 300 million Americans, 154.4 million of whom are in the work force.
Unemployment is expected to exceed 10% by many economists, and Obama "has warned that the unemployment rate will explode to at least 10% in 2009".
10 percent of 154 million is 15 million people out of work - more than during the Great Depression.
Given that the broader U-6 measure of unemployment is currently around 17% (ShadowStats.com puts the figure at 22%, and some put it even higher), the current numbers are that much worse.
But it is important to look at some details.
For example, official Bureau of Labor Statistics numbers put U-6 above 20% in several states:
- California: 21.9
- Nevada: 21.5
- Michigan 21.6
- Oregon 20.1
In the past year, unemployment has grown the fastest in the mountain West.
And certain races and age groups have gotten hit hard.
According to Congress' Joint Economic Committee:
By February 2010, the U-6 rate for African Americans rose to 24.9 percent.34.5% of young African American men were unemployed in October 2009.
As the Center for Immigration Studies noted last December:
Unemployment rates for less-educated and younger workers:
- As of the third quarter of 2009, the overall unemployment rate for native-born Americans is 9.5 percent; the U-6 measure shows it as 15.9 percent.
- The unemployment rate for natives with a high school degree or less is 13.1 percent. Their U-6 measure is 21.9 percent.
- The unemployment rate for natives with less than a high school education is 20.5 percent. Their U-6 measure is 32.4 percent.
- The unemployment rate for young native-born Americans (18-29) who have only a high school education is 19 percent. Their U-6 measure is 31.2 percent.
- The unemployment rate for native-born blacks with less than a high school education is 28.8 percent. Their U-6 measure is 42.2 percent.
- The unemployment rate for young native-born blacks (18-29) with only a high school education is 27.1 percent. Their U-6 measure is 39.8 percent.
- The unemployment rate for native-born Hispanics with less than a high school education is 23.2 percent. Their U-6 measure is 35.6 percent.
- The unemployment rate for young native-born Hispanics (18-29) with only a high school degree is 20.9 percent. Their U-6 measure is 33.9 percent.
No wonder Chris Tilly - director of the Institute for Research on Labor and Employment at UCLA - says that African-Americans and high school dropouts are experiencing depression-level unemployment.
And as I have previously noted, unemployment for those who earn $150,000 or more is only 3%, while unemployment for the poor is 31%.
The bottom line is that it is difficult to compare current unemployment with what occurred during the Great Depression. In some ways things seem better now. In other ways, they don't.
Factors like where you live, race, income and age greatly effect one's experience of the severity of unemployment in America.
In addition, wages have plummeted for those who are employed. As Pulitzer Prize-winning tax reporter David Cay Johnston notes:
Every 34th wage earner in America in 2008 went all of 2009 without earning a single dollar, new data from the Social Security Administration show. Total wages, median wages, and average wages all declined....
Professors Black and Wray Confirm that Bear Pledged the Same Mortgage to Multiple Buyers
I have repeatedly pointed out that mortgages were pledged to multiple buyers at the same time. See this and this.
Today, in another must-read piece, economics professors William Black and L. Randall Wray confirm:
Several banks would go after the same homeowner, each claiming to hold the same mortgage (Bear sold the same mortgage over and over).As USA Today pointed out in 2008, Bear was one of the big players in this area:
Bear Stearns was one of the biggest underwriters of complex investments linked to mortgages. Two of its hedge funds, heavily invested in subprime mortgages, folded in July.Alot of toxic mortgages and mortgage related assets ended up on the taxpayer's tab directly or indirectly.
***
Bear Stearns was linked to many other financial institutions, through the mortgage-backed securities it sponsored as well as through complex financial agreements called derivatives.The Fed wasn't so much concerned that 85-year-old Bear Stearns would go bankrupt, but rather that it would take other companies down with it, causing a financial meltdown.
For example, as Bloomberg noted in April 2009:
Maiden Lane I is a $25.7 billion portfolio of Bear Stearns securities related to commercial and residential mortgages. JPMorgan refused to buy them when it acquired Bear Stearns to avert the firm’s bankruptcy.
The Fed’s losses included writing down the value of commercial-mortgage holdings by 28 percent to $5.6 billion and residential loans by 38 percent to $937 million as of Dec. 31, the central bank said. Properties in California and Florida accounted for 45 percent of outstanding principal of the residential mortgages.
Saturday, October 23, 2010
Lawsuit Alleges that MERS Owes California a Potential $60-120 Billion in Unpaid Land-Recording Fees
Former hedge fund manager Shah Gilani notes:
In creating MERS, these institutions actually changed the land-title system that this country - for much of its history - has relied upon to determine legal ownership status of land titleholders.MERS is a shell company, with no employees. However, its parent does have employees.
Not only did the lenders sidestep (read that to mean avoid) paying billions of dollars in fees to local governments, they paid themselves from the fees that MERS collected.
MERS is facing class-action lawsuits and civil racketeering suits around the country and their members are being individually named in all these suits. One suit alleges that MERS owes California a potential $60 billion to $120 billion in unpaid land-recording fees.
If suits against MERS and all its members are successful, unpaid recording fees and fines (that can be as much as $10,000 per incident) would make every one of them insolvent.
As Bloomberg notes:
MERS Inc., which holds the liens, has no employees, and MERSCORP, the parent, has only about 50, [the MERS spokeswoman said].Plaintiffs' lawyers will undoubtedly argue that the "corporate veil should be pierced". In other words, they'll argue that MERS hasn't followed normal corporate formalities (or is inadequately capitalized), and so the big banks which own it should have to pay any judgments against it. I am not sure who will win that argument.
But Plaintiffs' lawyers will probably also name the banks themselves directly as co-defendants.
Gulf Oil Spill: Mission Accomplished or Ongoing Crisis?
The corporate media has almost entirely stopped covering the Gulf oil spill.
Many have tried to say that the effects of the spill are not nearly as bad as feared, and that everything is pretty much cleaned up and back to normal.
But today, it is widely being reported that there are currently massive stretches of weathered oil spotted in the Gulf of Mexico .
And websites like Florida Oil Spill Law (FOSL) have tirelessly been reporting on the Gulf oil spill this whole time.
To give an example of the ongoing crisis in the Gulf, here's a roundup of some of the top stories from FOSL from the past 3 days:
- Boat captain “bleeding from her vagina” — “I’m bleeding from my anus, too… This thing is killing me”
Friday, October 22, 2010
70% Of All Stock Market Trades Are Held for An Average of 11 SECONDS
The Fourteenth Banker writes today:
In the stock market, program trading dominates volume. I heard recently that 70% of trade positions are held for an average of 11 seconds.
He's correct.
As the New York Times dealbook noted in May:
These are short-term bets. Very short. The founder of Tradebot, in Kansas City, Mo., told students in 2008 that his firm typically held stocks for 11 seconds. Tradebot, one of the biggest high-frequency traders around, had not had a losing day in four years, he said
Similarly, FT's Martin Wheatley pointed out last month:
I know of one HFT firm operated out of the west coast of the US that boasts its average holding period for US equities is 11 seconds
And market analyst Peter Cohan writes at AOL's Daily Finance:
70% of trading volume on the major exchanges is conducted by high-frequency traders who hold a stock for an average of 11 seconds.
But as Tyler Durden points out, alot can happen in 11 seconds when the players are high-powered computers:
07-29-10
BATS "Flag Repeater". 15,000 quotes in 11 seconds, dropping the ASK price 1 penny each quote from $9.36 to $8.58 and back up again.
Christopher Whalen: Freddie and Fannie Helped to Create Epidemic of Mortgage Fraud
Chris Whalen (co-founder of Institutional Risk Analytics) knows a thing or two about banking and mortgages. Whalen has been hailed by Nouriel Roubini as one of the leading independent analysts of the U.S. banking system, and there are few people who know more about mortgage fraud.
Whalen points out in a must-read article that Fannie and Freddie helped create the epidemic of mortgage fraud:
Whalen blasts the cowards in Washington for failing to unwind the mortgage fraud:By summer of 2007 most of the bulk GSE pools underwritten by the MIs [mortgage insurers] started to experience extremely high levels of delinquencies. But rather than curtail MI operations and shore up underwriting, the MIs made a big push and increased subpirme production insuring large amounts of subprime product (lots of 220s) all the way into first quarter 2008.
The MIs tripled down and did so in hopes of making enough fee income to (1) meet plan and (2) shore up capital that had started to bleed. This push, which was not always reported honestly to share and bond holders, signed the respective death warrants for Fannie and Freddie. But the zombie dance party rocks on.
So today the MIs are still operating, though they are not providing insurance because they can't. Observers in the operational trenches tell The IRA that virtually no MI claims are being paid - even if the claim is legitimate. The MIs are very undercapitalized and still bleeding heavily. But they get continued business because the GSEs demand MI on high LTV loans. Lenders are forced to use the MIs and consumers are made to pay the premium. Thus the auditors of the GSE continue to respect the cover from the MIs, even though the entire industry is arguably insolvent.
Thus we go back to the low-income borrower, who is forced by the GSEs to pay for private mortgage insurance that will never pay out. The relationship between the GSEs and the MIs is identical to the "side letter" insurance transactions between AIG andGen Re, and come to think of it, the AIG credit default swaps trades with Goldman Sachs (GS) and various other Wall Street dealers. In each case the substance of the transaction is to falsify the financial statements of the participants. And in each case, the acts are arguably criminal fraud.
The invidious cowards who inhabit Washington are unwilling to restructure the largest banks and GSEs. The reluctance comes partly from what truths restructuring will reveal. As a result, these same large zombie banks and the U.S. economy will continue to shrink under the weight of bad debt, public and private. Remember that the Dodd-Frank legislation was not so much about financial reform as protecting the housing GSEs.
Because President Barack Obama and the leaders of both political parties are unwilling to address the housing crisis and the wasting effects on the largest banks, there will be no growth and no net job creation in the U.S. for the next several years. And because the Obama White House is content to ignore the crisis facing millions of American homeowners, who are deep underwater and will eventually default on their loans, the efforts by the Fed to reflate the U.S. economy and particularly consumer spending will be futile. As Alan Meltzer noted to Tom Keene on Bloomberg Radio earlier this year: "This is not a monetary problem."
***
The policy of the Fed and Treasury with respect to the large banks is state socialism writ large, without even the pretense of a greater public good.
***
The fraud and obfuscation now underway in Washington to protect the TBTF banks and GSEs totals into the trillions of dollars and rises to the level of treason.
***
And in the case of the zombie banks, the GSEs and the MIs, the fraud is being actively concealed by Congress, the White House and agencies of the U.S. government led by the Federal Reserve Board. Is this not tyranny?
Thursday, October 21, 2010
Why We're Losing the War on Terror
Everyone knows that only Muslim-lovers and left-wing peaceniks want to stop the wars in Afghanistan and other Muslim countries, that terrorism is caused by Muslim ideology, and that we're fighting them "over there" so we don't have to fight them here.
Right?
In fact, as University of Chicago professor Robert A. Pape - who specializes in international security affairs - points out:
Extensive research into the causes of suicide terrorism proves Islam isn't to blame -- the root of the problem is foreign military occupations.Wait, what? That can't be right!
But as Pape explains:
Each month, there are more suicide terrorists trying to kill Americans and their allies in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other Muslim countries than in all the years before 2001 combined.But surely Pape and his team of University of Chicago researchers are wrong. Surely other security experts disagree, right?
***
New research provides strong evidence that suicide terrorism such as that of 9/11 is particularly sensitive to foreign military occupation, and not Islamic fundamentalism or any ideology independent of this crucial circumstance. Although this pattern began to emerge in the 1980s and 1990s, a wealth of new data presents a powerful picture.More than 95 percent of all suicide attacks are in response to foreign occupation, according to extensive research [co-authored by James K. Feldman - former professor of decision analysis and economics at the Air Force Institute of Technology and the School of Advanced Airpower Studies] that we conducted at the University of Chicago's Project on Security and Terrorism, where we examined every one of the over 2,200 suicide attacks across the world from 1980 to the present day. As the United States has occupied Afghanistan and Iraq, which have a combined population of about 60 million, total suicide attacks worldwide have risen dramatically -- from about 300 from 1980 to 2003, to 1,800 from 2004 to 2009. Further, over 90 percent of suicide attacks worldwide are now anti-American. The vast majority of suicide terrorists hail from the local region threatened by foreign troops, which is why 90 percent of suicide attackers in Afghanistan are Afghans.
Israelis have their own narrative about terrorism, which holds that Arab fanatics seek to destroy the Jewish state because of what it is, not what it does. But since Israel withdrew its army from Lebanon in May 2000, there has not been a single Lebanese suicide attack. Similarly, since Israel withdrew from Gaza and large parts of the West Bank, Palestinian suicide attacks are down over 90 percent.
Some have disputed the causal link between foreign occupation and suicide terrorism, pointing out that some occupations by foreign powers have not resulted in suicide bombings -- for example, critics often cite post-World War II Japan and Germany. Our research provides sufficient evidence to address these criticisms by outlining the two factors that determine the likelihood of suicide terrorism being employed against an occupying force.
The first factor is social distance between the occupier and occupied. The wider the social distance, the more the occupied community may fear losing its way of life. Although other differences may matter, research shows that resistance to occupations is especially likely to escalate to suicide terrorism when there is a difference between the predominant religion of the occupier and the predominant religion of the occupied.
Religious difference matters not because some religions are predisposed to suicide attacks. Indeed, there are religious differences even in purely secular suicide attack campaigns, such as the LTTE (Hindu) against the Sinhalese (Buddhists).
Rather, religious difference matters because it enables terrorist leaders to claim that the occupier is motivated by a religious agenda that can scare both secular and religious members of a local community -- this is why Osama bin Laden never misses an opportunity to describe U.S. occupiers as "crusaders" motivated by a Christian agenda to convert Muslims, steal their resources, and change the local population's way of life.
The second factor is prior rebellion. Suicide terrorism is typically a strategy of last resort, often used by weak actors when other, non-suicidal methods of resistance to occupation fail. This is why we see suicide attack campaigns so often evolve from ordinary terrorist or guerrilla campaigns, as in the cases of Israel and Palestine, the Kurdish rebellion in Turkey, or the LTTE in Sri Lanka.
One of the most important findings from our research is that empowering local groups can reduce suicide terrorism. In Iraq, the surge's success was not the result of increased U.S. military control of Anbar province, but the empowerment of Sunni tribes, commonly called the Anbar Awakening, which enabled Iraqis to provide for their own security. On the other hand, taking power away from local groups can escalate suicide terrorism. In Afghanistan, U.S. and Western forces began to exert more control over the country's Pashtun regions starting in early 2006, and suicide attacks dramatically escalated from this point on.
***
The first step is recognizing that occupations in the Muslim world don't make Americans any safer -- in fact, they are at the heart of the problem.
No.
The top security experts - conservative hawks and liberal doves alike - agree that waging war in the Middle East weakens national security and increases terrorism. See this, this, this, this, this and this.
As one of the top counter-terrorism experts (the former number 2 counter-terrorism expert at the State Department) told me, starting wars against states which do not pose an imminent threat to America's national security increases the threat of terrorism because:
One of the principal causes of terrorism is injuries to people and families.(Take another look at the painting above).
And its not only war in general as an abstract concept. The methods we're using to wage war are increasing terrorism.
As one example, torture reduces our national security and creates new terrorists.
Unfortunately, we are continuing to indiscriminately kill civilians using drone strikes, and we are continuing to torture innocent people (see this, this, this, and this).
This is not a question of being a "Muslim-sympathizer". I am not a Muslim (personally, I and the rest of my family go to Church, albeit a non-dogmatic one). This isn't about religion at all.
Its all about being practical in protecting our national security.
It might feel good to have guns a blazing. But unfortunately, instead of doing what will protect us, we keep shooting ourselves in the foot.
And in doing so, we are bankrupting our country.
80% of Citi Mortgages Defective
Bloomberg notes:
In addition, a reader sent me documents which he says prove that Citi was running foreclosure mills. I will post the documents after I have time to read and digest them.Richard M. Bowen, former chief underwriter for Citigroup’s consumer-lending group, said he warned his superiors of concerns that some types of loans in securities didn’t conform with representations and warranties in 2006 and 2007.
“In mid-2006, I discovered that over 60 percent of these mortgages purchased and sold were defective,” Bowen testified on April 7 before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission created by Congress. “Defective mortgages increased during 2007 to over 80 percent of production.”
The Mortgage Mod/Foreclosure Scam
Southern California foreclosure attorney Jeff Barnes tells me:
Borrowers are being lured into loan mod scams where they are told that they have to be 2-3 months behind in payments before a loan mod will be considered, then when they make application, the foreclosure process has already started (and the claims have been made against the insurances, etc. because the loan is in default) and the loan mod is denied “because of the foreclosure”.In other words, the lure of mortgage modifications are being used to trap homeowners into the foreclosure process.
And see this:
Wednesday, October 20, 2010
Developments in the Mortgage, Mortgage Backed Securities and Foreclosure Crises
Here's a round up of breaking stories today:
- Bank of America Corp. and its Countrywide Home Loans unit were accused of racketeering in a lawsuit filed by two Indiana residents claiming that perjured affidavits were used to foreclose on their home.
1 of the 2 Administrative Judges at the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Vowed NEVER to Let a Complainant Win. He's Kept His Promise for 20 Years
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is an important agency. It is largely responsible for regulating derivatives and other important instruments.
It is supposed to prevent and prosecute fraud.
So it is stunning that one of the two administrative judges for the CFTC has written and filed a "Notice and Order" saying:
There are two administrative law judges at the Commodity Futures Trading Commission: myself and the Honorable Bruce Levine. On Judge Levine's first week on the job, nearly twenty years ago, he came into my office and stated that he had promised Wendy Gramm, then Chairwoman of the Commission, that we would never rule in a complainant's favor. A review of his rulings will confirm that he has fulfilled his vow. Judge Levine, in the cynical guise of enforcing the rules, forces pro se complaints to run a hostile procedural gauntlet until they lose hope, and either withdraw their complaint or settle for a pittance, regardless of the merits of the case.
***
In light of these unfortunate facts, if I simply announced my intention to retire, the seven reparation cases on my docket would be reassigned to the only other administrative law judge of the Commission, Judge Levine. This I cannot do in good conscience. Accordingly, I recommend that the Commission request ... the services of an administrative law judge to be detailed to the Commission from [another] agency ....
Wendy Gramm is the wife of former Senator Phil Gramm (one of the main sponsors of the Commodities Futures Modernization Act 2000, which kept derivatives largely deregulated), and was heavily involved in the Enron scandal (see this and this).
Update: The Wall Street Journal has a piece out today claiming that Judge Painter is senile and more than a little nuts. I don't know whether or not that is true. But the 2000 Wall Street Journal article which Painter attaches to his Notice and Order does seem to show that - at least as of 2000 - Levine always ruled against the Complainant in cases where the Respondent showed up.
Judge Painter's claims can easily be checked by reporters by searching the CFTC database, and by speaking with Complainants who appeared before Judge Levine. You can start here.
H/t Karl Denninger and Daily Bell.
Foreclosure Expert Confirms Mortgages Pledged Multiple Times, Not Actually Securitized, Document Problem Is Really a System of "Push-Button Fraud"
Yesterday, I showed that mortgages were fraudulently pledged to multiple buyers at the same time.
Today, foreclosure expert Neil Garfield (former investment banker, trial lawyer and board member of several financial institutions) confirms this, explains that the loans were not actually securitized, and the whole "sloppy paperwork" excuse is really an attempt to explain away a system of push-button fraud:
The game was to move money under a scheme of deceit and fraud. First sell the bonds and collect the money into a pool. Second take your fees, third take what’s left and get it committed into “loans” (which were in actuality securities) sold to homeowners under the same false pretenses as the bonds were sold to investors. By controlling the flow of funds and documentation, the middlemen were able to sell, pledge and otherwise trade off the flow of receivables several times over — a necessary complexity not only for the profit it generated, but to make it far more difficult for anyone to track the footprints in the sand.
If the loans had actually been securitized, the issue would not arise. They were not securitized. This was a mass illusion or hallucination induced by Wall Street spiking the punch bowl. The gap (second tier yield spread premium) created between the amount of money funded by investors and the amount of money actually deployed into “loans” was so large that it could not be justified as fees. It was profit on sale from the aggregator to the “trust” (special purpose vehicle). It was undisclosed, deceitful and fraudulent.
Thus the “credit enhancement” scenario with tranches, credit default swaps and insurance had to be created so that it appeared that the gap was covered. But that could only work if the parties to those contracts claimed to have the loans. And since multiple parties were making the same claim in these side contracts and guarantees, counter-party agreements etc. the actual documents could not be allowed to appear nor even be created unless and until it was the end of the road in an evidential hearing in court. They used when necessary “copies” that were in fact fabricated (counterfeited) as needed to suit the occasion. You end up with lawyers arriving in court with the “original” note signed in blue (for the desired effect on the Judge) when it was signed in black — but the lawyer didn’t know that. The actual original is either destroyed (see Katherine Porter’s 2007 study) or “lost.” In this case “lost” doesn’t mean really lost. It means that if they really must come up with something they will call an original they will do so.
So the reason why the paperwork is all out of order is that there was no paperwork. There only entries on databases and spreadsheets. The loans were not in actuality assigned to any one particular trust or any one particular bond or any one particular individual or group of investors. They were “allocated” as receivables multiple times to multiple parties usually to an extent in excess of the nominal receivable itself. This is why the servicers keep paying on loans that are being declared in default. The essential component of every loan that was never revealed to either the lenders (investors) nor the borrowers (homeowner/investors) was the addition of co-obligors and terms that neither the investor nor the borrower knew anything about. The “insurance” and other enhancements were actually cover for the intermediaries who had no money at risk in the loans, but for the potential liability for defrauding the lenders and borrowers.
The result, as anyone can plainly see, is that the typical Ponzi outcome — heads I win, tails you lose.
***
So the paperwork was carefully created and crafted to cover the tracks of theft. Most of the securitization paperwork remains buried such that it takes search services to reach any of them. The documents that were needed to record title and encumbrances was finessed so that they could keep their options open when someone made demand for actual proof. The documents were not messed up and neither was the processing. They were just keeping their options open, so like the salad oil scandal, they could fill the tank that someone wanted to look into.
Tuesday, October 19, 2010
Was Abacus the Business Model for the Entire Mortgage Industry?
As I've repeatedly pointed out, the big banks intentionally signed up as many borrowers as possible, even if there was no way they could repay their loans.
For example, I recently wrote:
But there might have been another reason that loaning to borrower who couldn't repay was the prevalent business model.[Professor William] Black explained that fraud by a financial company usually involves the company:
1) Growing like crazy2) Making loans to people who are uncreditworthy, because they’ll agree to pay you more, and that’s how you grow rapidly. You can grow really fast if you loan to people who can’t you pay you backand3) Using extreme leverage.This combination guarantees stratospheric initial profits during the expansion phase of the bubble.
But it guarantees a catastrophic subsequent failure when the bubble loses steam.
And collectively - if a lot of companies are playing this game - it produces extraordinary losses (more than all other forms of property crime combined), and a crash.
In other words, the companies intentionally make loans to people who will not be able to repay them, because - during an expanding bubble phase - they'll make huge sums of money. The top executives of these companies will make massive salaries and bonuses during the bubble (enough to live like kings even even if the companies go belly up after the bubble phase).[Simon] Johnson confirmed that a high housing default rate was part of the banks' models. The financial giants knew they would make huge sums during the boom, and then transfer their losses to the American people during the bust.
As foreclosure expert Neil Garfield notes, mortgages are worth a lot more if they default than if they perform.
Specifically, a mortgage worth $300,000 if the homeowner repays in full might be worth $9 million to the various owners of synthetic cdos and credit default swaps if the owner defaults.
We know - as alleged by the SEC:
Paulson & Co. effectively shorted the RMBS portfolio it helped select by entering into credit default swaps (CDS) with Goldman Sachs to buy protection on specific layers of the ABACUS capital structure.Paulson also advised Los Angeles apartment mogul Jeff Greene to do something similar. Greene was heavily involved in the subprime market, and he bought the worst of the mortgage backed securities, and then bet against the bonds using CDS.
But Garfield says that it is broader than just a couple of investors like Paulson and Greene. He believes that was basically the business model for the entire mortgage industry.
He said that the big banks that packaged mortgage backed securities had an incentive to suck in really bad mortgages. If a certain percentage of the mortgages default, the cdo and cds side bets pay many times more than the actual mortgage could possibly pay.
Similarly, Southern California foreclosure attorney Jeff Barnes writes:
Foreclosure fraud investigators should drill down on the extent to which these incentives motivated the mbs packagers to include mortgages which did not meet underwriting standards.[We have acquired] computerized mortgage loan investigation and securitized mortgage loan trust software and special computer terminals which can track a mortgage loan’s history including its assignment to specific tranches inside of a trust. The information being revealed by this unique research tool is both fascinating and disturbing.
A sample of what our researchers are finding: loans which were assigned to multiple tranches within one securitized mortgage loan trust; the assignment of the loan to different trusts; the divison of the loan into parts across tranches, and more. What this means to foreclosure defense discovery is nothing short of monumental.
If a loan is assigned to different tranches and/or different trusts, with each tranche or trust having its own series of credit enhancements and insurances, this means the possibility of multiple levels of insurance for the same loan, which goes to prove what we have been arguing for years: that upon securitization, the mortgage loans were insured with multiple layers of insurance so that when the loan went into default, those in the placement chain could reap untold profits by having the same risk paid over and over and over again through multiple claims or reserves. Anyone who read through the SEC v. Goldman Sachs lawsuit knows this.
As such, any foreclosure defense should now hammer, hard, on ALL available credit enhancements, insurances, tranche assignments, and all agreements relating thereto. We will make a predition here: that very soon, there are going to be a series of cases where it is revealed, in discovery, that mortgage loans were paid 2, 3, 4, or more times on default and that the foreclosing party is simply trying to get paid a 5th or more time by stealing the borrower’s house under false pretenses and with material omissions and improper objections as to discovery related to setoffs (which objections we predict will be overruled once the judiciary is educated as to these matters). Once that happens, we see a literal tsunami of fraud upon the court claims and damage claims against the current foreclosure perpetrators.
They should also investigate the extent to which these incentives motivated mortgage originators to create "liar's loans", "ninja loans", "neutron loans", and "toxic waste".
See this on how credit default swaps can be used like buying fire insurance on someone else's house and then burning down the house, and this explanation by Ellen Brown (starting about half way into video).
Monday, October 18, 2010
Mortgages Were Fraudulently Pledged to Multiple Buyers at the Same Time
Bank of America alleged in a court filing this June:
It appears as though many loans and other mortgage-related assets have been double and even triple-pledged to various constituencies.
April Charney - a consumer lawyer with Jacksonville Area Legal Aid - and CNBC's Dennis Kneale noted in February 2009 that courts have found that some mortgages have been sold again and again to different trusts, when they should have only been sold once.
Kneale explained that that is the reason that two different banks sometimes try to simultaneously foreclose on the same home:
And today, Chris Whalen told CNBC's Larry Kudlow that Bear Stearns will be exposed as having sold the same loan to different investors on numerous occasions:
As I have repeatedly pointed out, the failure of the mortgage originators and banks to prepare and record proper documentation has led to an epidemic of fraud. The pledging of the same mortgage again and again to different trusts related to mortgage backed securities is just one result.
And as long-time foreclosure investigator Nye Lavalle writes:
Update: Bank of America has sued the FDIC in connection with claims that:On thousands of occasions I stated to regulators, CEOS, banks, Fannie and Freddie that the practices of the banks were that they were double and multi-pledging assets and pledging paid off and refinance notes to securitizations. This is something April, Max and I have discussed for years now. Now, they come and admit that each of my allegations were true Without analyzing the deal, as complex as they are, you WILL NEVER KNOW IF THE FORECLOSING PARTY HAS “ANY” RIGHT TO FORECLOSE!!!The motives I identified for the “Blank Endorsements” and missing assignments and "pre-notarized" “Blank Assignments” and “Blank Allonges” that “were placed into the “custodial/collateral” files were to be able to:Multi-pledge collateral (Notes) so as to cook the books ....
Executives at Taylor Bean, Colonial and Platinum ... fraudulently schemed to "double- and triple-pledge mortgages and steal assets" to hide their faltering conditions as the housing market declined.
Saturday, October 16, 2010
Are ALL Mortgage Backed Securities a Scam?
Pensions and other large investors may sue the banks which sold them mortgage backed securities (mbs) based upon fraudulent misrepresentation.
Indeed, as William D. Cohen and Felix Salmon point out in must-read stories, the big banks hired a company called Clayton Holdings to sample the quality of mortgages being purchased.
Clayton found very high percentages of mortgages which did not meet minimal underwriting standards.
However, instead of disclosing to the investors purchasing mbs that many of the mortgages were bad - or even that there were samples and statistical analyzes performed by Clayton and the banks - the banks simply kept it to themselves, and used that inside information about poor mortgage quality to negotiate a discount of the price that the banks paid when purchasing the loan portfolios from the folks who originated the loans.
This is like buying a used car, but having a mechanic look it over first. Once the mechanic discovered a cracked engine block, the buyer negotiates the purchase price way down, but then turns around and sells the car for a higher price without ever disclosing that there was a cracked engine block or even that a mechanic had looked it over.
Indeed, its worse ... at least with the car, there is something physical to inspect. But because many of the underlying mortgage documents have gone missing, there is nothing for the mbs buyer to investigate even if he wanted to. For example, as I've previously noted, MERS - the holder of 60% of all U.S. residential mortgages (and many commercial mortgages) - is a shell company, and many mortgage documents were forged.
But a financial insider claims (via David Kotok - chief investment officer of Cumberland Advisors - and investment adviser John Mauldin) that the entire mbs sausage-making process is a scam:
"The whole purpose of MBSs was for different investors to have their different risk appetites satiated with different bonds. Some bond customers wanted super-safe bonds with low returns, some others wanted riskier bonds with correspondingly higher rates of return.In other words, the author is saying that mbs buyers thought that they were buying specific tranches tied to real mortgages, but they were just getting a statistical cut of wispy, non-corporeal representations of information related to the entire universe of mortgages floating around in the digitized MERS ether."Therefore, as everyone knows, the loans were 'bundled' into REMICs (Real-Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits, a special vehicle designed to hold the loans for tax purposes), and then "sliced & diced"...split up and put into tranches, according to their likelihood of default, their interest rates, and other characteristics.
"This slicing and dicing created 'senior tranches,' where the loans would likely be paid in full, if the past history of mortgage loan statistics was to be believed. And it also created 'junior tranches,' where the loans might well default, again according to past history and statistics. (A whole range of tranches was created, of course, but for the purposes of this discussion we can ignore all those countless other variations.)
"These various tranches were sold to different investors, according to their risk appetite. That's why some of the MBS bonds were rated as safe as Treasury bonds, and others were rated by the ratings agencies as risky as junk bonds.
"But here's the key issue: When an MBS was first created, all the mortgages were pristine...none had defaulted yet, because they were all brand-new loans. Statistically, some would default and some others would be paid back in full...but which ones specifically would default? No one knew, of course. If I toss a coin 1,000 times, statistically, 500 tosses the coin will land heads...but what will the result be of, say, the 723rd toss? No one knows.
"Same with mortgages.
"So in fact, it wasn't that the riskier loans were in junior tranches and the safer ones were in senior tranches: rather, all the loans were in the REMIC, and if and when a mortgage in a given bundle of mortgages defaulted, the junior tranche holders would take the losses first, and the senior tranche holder last.
"But who were the owners of the junior-tranche bond and the senior-tranche bonds? Two different people. Therefore, the mortgage note was not actually signed over to the bond holder. In fact, it couldn't be signed over. Because, again, since no one knew which mortgage would default first, it was impossible to assign a specific mortgage to a specific bond.
"Therefore, how to make sure the safe mortgage loan stayed with the safe MBS tranche, and the risky and/or defaulting mortgage went to the riskier tranche?
"Enter stage right the famed MERS...the Mortgage Electronic Registration System.
"MERS was the repository of these digitized mortgage notes that the banks originated from the actual mortgage loans signed by homebuyers. MERS was jointly owned by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (yes, those two again ...I know, I know: like the chlamydia and the gonorrhea of the financial world...you cure 'em, but they just keep coming back).
"The purpose of MERS was to help in the securitization process. Basically, MERS directed defaulting mortgages to the appropriate tranches of mortgage bonds. MERS was essentially where the digitized mortgage notes were sliced and diced and rearranged so as to create the mortgage-backed securities. Think of MERS as Dr. Frankenstein's operating table, where the beast got put together.
"However, legally...and this is the important part...MERS didn't hold any mortgage notes: the true owner of the mortgage notes should have been the REMICs.
"But the REMICs didn't own the notes either, because of a fluke of the ratings agencies: the REMICs had to be "bankruptcy remote," in order to get the precious ratings needed to peddle mortgage-backed Securities to institutional investors.
So are all mortgage backed securities a scam?
The following 2007 chart from Janet Tavakoli might provide a hint:
See also this, this, this and this.
Update: Gonzalo Lira tells me that he is the original author of the above-described quote reproduced by David Kotok and John Mauldin.
Friday, October 15, 2010
Krugman: "The Question Is Whether Our Economy Is Governed By Any Kind Of Rule Of Law"
Paul Krugman writes:
The mortgage mess is making nonsense of claims that we have effective contract enforcement — in fact, the question is whether our economy is governed by any kind of rule of law.
***True to form, the Obama administration’s response has been to oppose any action that might upset the banks, like a temporary moratorium on foreclosures while some of the issues are resolved. Instead, it is asking the banks, very nicely, to behave better and clean up their act. I mean, that’s worked so well in the past, right?
The response from the right is, however, even worse .... conservative commentators like those at The Wall Street Journal’s editorial page have come out dismissing the lack of proper documents as a triviality. In effect, they’re saying that if a bank says it owns your house, we should just take its word. To me, this evokes the days when noblemen felt free to take whatever they wanted, knowing that peasants had no standing in the courts. But then, I suspect that some people regard those as the good old days.
I'm happy that someone as prominent as Krugman is weighing in on the side of the rule of law.
I've been hammering on that topic for years:
The Real Danger From the Foreclosure Crisis
People were told that the investment in their house was as solid as a rock:
Unfortunately, millions are now upside down, because the housing bubble - fed to a large extent by fraud - has burst:
And the people who supposedly verified the accuracy of mortgage documents never did so, and - in many cases - weren't who they said there were:The foreclosure scandal will likely depress the real estate market, as clear title for millions of homeowners comes into question.
This is obviously a huge problem.
But the largest problem for the economy could be - not from mortgages themselves - but from the securitizations of those mortgages:
Joshua Rosner - noted bond analyst, and Managing Director at independent research consultancy Graham Fisher & Co - told his clients Tuesday, that the impact from foreclosure gate on the securitized market could be huge.
As Shahien Nasiripour reports:
[Rosner] said he believes the paperwork problems regarding foreclosed properties will ultimately be resolved, he wrote that "We have a larger and more significant concern, which, if proved out, could call into question the validity of nearly all securitizations."
***
Rosner said, the current scandal "may give investors an opening to challenge the legality of deals, threatening to unnerve financial markets."
***Those challenges, which would result from the revelations unearthed during the foreclosure process, could then be used to investigate the documentation practices that occurred when these mortgages were first given to borrowers. Inflated income levels, fake home appraisals and other lies inserted into mortgage documents -- something Wall Street and Washington have long suspected, but never truly investigated -- could then be used to force big banks to buy back the garbage they peddled in the first place to unwitting investors.
Another possibility is that trustees, who oversee the flow of documents from the originator of the mortgage to the vehicle that holds those documents for investors, may not have properly performed their role, either.
***
Just four firms dominate the trustee market for mortgage-backed securities in which the mortgages aren't guaranteed by Uncle Sam: Deutsche Bank, U.S. Bancorp, Bank of New York Mellon, and HSBC serve as trustees for 70.5 percent of all such issuance since 2005, according to Asset-Backed Alert, an industry newsletter and data provider. An additional four firms -- Wells Fargo, Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, and Citigroup -- control 29.1 percent, Asset-Backed Alert data show.
All told, these eight firms have served as trustees for 99.6 percent of all private-label mortgage-backed securities issued since 2005.
Were the document errors now cropping up in a handful of cases "to be found to have resulted from [the] widespread failure of issuers and trusts" to properly handle and transfer documents, "there would ... appear to be a strong legal basis for the calling into question [of] securitizations," Rosner wrote.
Joshua Rosner On Foreclosure Fraud
As David Faber notes:(Because many there may be problems with many commercial mortgages as well, trillions more in commercial mortgage backed securities may also be at issue.)The worry centers on the mortgage loan pools created by many of the big banks as they fed the seemingly endless desire for mortgage-backed securities and CDO's (collateralized debt obligations) made from them.
It appears the mortgage content of many of those pools—created when the banks were dominating the mortgage securitization market in 2005, 2006 and 2007—may have been misrepresented. For example, an underwriter may have maintained that 80 percent of the mortgages in the pool were for primary residences when in fact far fewer were for that purpose. Or the underwriter stated that only 10 percent of the pool would be made of of "no-doc" loans—those that include less documentation about the borrower—when in fact the percentage was far higher.
That could be fraud, and if so, the creator of the mortgage pool could be liable. Given that the market for private label RMBS (residential mortgage-backed securities) was $1.5 trillion, the potential liability may be considerable. And while most of the originators of these mortgages are long gone, the securitizers are not.
Joshua Rosner agrees.
Rosner told Elliot Spitzer, the banks and rating agencies knew that 28% of the loans which the banks securitized and sold to pension funds and other investors didn't meet underwriting standards. And yet they turned around and processed them into sausage (securitized them) and sold them to investors, representing that they did meet underwriting standards.
Rosner said that the rating agencies apparently intentionally avoided looking into this, since the more deals they approved, the more profits the rating agencies got. [For background on the financial incentive of rating agencies to give high ratings to literally anything, see this.]
And Rosner points out that - knowing about the high percentage mortgages which failed to meet underwriting standards - the big banks then bet against the housing market. Spitzer called that trading on inside information:
The potential securitization problem is why bank stocks are now in trouble. See this, this and this.
And as former Managing Director of Goldman Sachs Nomi Prins points out, the Bernanke and Geithner are terrified of a meltdown in the securitization market as well:
See this for more information on the government's ill-conceived effort to prop up the prices of securitized assets.The free-market, let the banks do what they do mentality was what allowed them to create a $14 trillion mountain of securities backed by precarious mortgages to begin with.
***
But the real reason for Geithner’s reluctance about a foreclosure moratorium is that he’s scared stiff about those securities – because even if he won’t admit it, he knows that the bailout wasn’t just about TARP and Bernanke isn’t just an economic savior.
***
If foreclosed homes couldn’t be sold because of fraudulent paperwork or had to wait for more detailed inspections, you can imagine how difficult selling assets stuffed with faulty loans might be. If it’s tough to find a title for a foreclosed home, think how tough it is to back the related loan out of a pyramid of securities sitting on top of it.See, the loan that might be analyzed in a foreclosure situation could be part of a chain connecting the underlying home to 20 or 50 different securitized assets, all depending on it for either the interest payments the loan was supposed to provide, or the value of the foreclosure property if those payments stopped (in Wall Street speak, the "recovery value"). If a foreclosed property isn’t selling, it’s not recovering any money back to any asset waiting for it. Think what that can do to the value of toxic assets living at the Fed and the Treasury Department. Kill it.
The reason TARP and all the other subsidies happened was that Hank Paulson, Ben Bernanke, Tim Geithner (the pillage gang) and the most powerful Wall Street CEOs were scared. Banks had stopped trusting each other (no one cared about the person who couldn’t pay their mortgage, or had their home taken, whatever the reason). When there is no confidence in the market, there is no bid for securities, no matter what the reason.
The banks couldn’t pay for all their leverage and they were facing bankruptcy if the system remained seized up. So the gang paid to keep the securitization market going, by finding a home or back-up home for the assets. They did not propose any remotely effective plan to help individuals at the loan level .... They merely enabled the worst practices and excesses to keep going in the name of saving the country from a greater depression, by shifting them to Washington and providing the illusion of demand for them.
Foreclosure fraud is not new. Many sane people and organizations have been talking about fraud for years -- you don’t manufacture $14 trillion worth of mortgage-backed securities and all their permutations and mega leverage out of $1.4 trillion worth of subprime loans in five years without cutting a lot of corners. Banks knew that. But when the value of their assets plummeted, unlike individual borrowers, they got to dump them on the Fed and the Treasury department, while receiving cash injections and guarantees, and cheap money subsidies in return.
As Congressman Brad Miller told Dylan Ratigan, failure to use subpoena power to audit the quality of the mortgages in the securitized pools held by Fannie and Freddie and to pursue all available legal rights to protect taxpayers from getting stuck with the bill for toxic securitized assets would constitute yet another stealth bailout of the big banks:


